On June 20, 2023, Ambassador Fu Cong had a conversation with Markus Herrmann, co-founder and managing director of China Macro Group, during a webinar “China-EU Relations – Beijing’s View on Challenges and Opportunities” hosted by the stars, a Zurich-based foundation. The transcript of the conversation is as follows:
Markus Herrmann: Ambassador Fu Cong, I would like to thank you for your time. I’ll directly kick off with the first question and then hand it over to you. So the first starter question I have is, what are the aspects of polity or institutional design of the European Union that you find interesting or confusing that you have to explain when you’re briefing Beijing on European matters?
Fu Cong: First, thank you, Markus, for having me on the program, and it’s a pleasure to attend this webinar. Good morning from Brussels to all the audience.
On this question, I have to say that since I came here, I’ve been trying my best to learn about the EU institutions. I have to admit that it is quite a big institution and it is quite confusing and very complex, especially the relationship between different institutions of the EU. What is most confusing for me is the relationship between the member states and the European Commission. I’m a diplomat and I’ve been dealing with multilateral institutions in my whole career. I have the feeling that for all international organizations, member states should be the driving force. Here in the EU, I thought that should be the case. But in some specific cases, it doesn’t seem to be like that. In certain cases, especially in areas involving foreign policy and national security, according to my understanding of the EU constitution, it should be the privilege of the member states. But what we hear now is that the European Commission is having a stronger voice, and sometimes it seems that the Commission is ordering the member states to do things that the member states may not agree to. So that is the most confusing part of the EU as far as I’m concerned.
Markus Herrmann: You’ve described the complexity around the horizontal and vertical division of roles. China has, maybe not known to everybody, published three consecutive white papers on the European Union and what its policy was towards the European Union since 2003. How important is the EU for China from a strategic perspective? How do you see the EU as an actor in international politics?
Fu Cong: Actually, our position on the EU has been quite consistent over the years. We see the EU as a major player on the international stage, both politically and economically. We see the EU as a partner rather than a rival, as some people wanted to make it to be. For us, we see that there are a lot of common grounds between China and the EU, and there are many things that China and the EU can join hands in tackling, especially when it comes to global challenges like climate change. Nowadays, artificial intelligence is an area that has attracted a lot of interest and attention. I think, in that area, China and the EU can have a lot to share and a lot to discuss. Also, in my former area, which is the non-proliferation, we have always been saying that China and the EU share a lot of interests and common grounds. So that’s how we see the EU. Despite some of the difficulties and challenges we are faced with, we still believe that China and the EU have a lot to do for the world and for ourselves.
Markus Herrmann: One follow-up question, Ambassador Fu, because you said that the Chinese policy had been consistent over this time, do you think the perception of the EU as a political actor in international politics has changed across these white papers and over time?
Fu Cong: Because the issues change, it is natural that some of the positions of countries can also evolve. But as I said, there are a lot of common interests that actually underline our mutual relationship. So there are all the reasons that we should strengthen our cooperation and try to overcome any problem or challenge that may appear. As I said, this is in the interests not only of ourselves but also of the whole world.
Markus Herrmann: If we talk about how EU-China relations are structured, there used to be a so-called EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, a mutually agreed cooperation framework from November 2013. But right now, there has not been an extension to this agenda. What in your mind right now is the framework that is helping to structure EU-China relations?
Fu Cong: Indeed, we have that important document. But unfortunately, it has not been renewed. But still, China and the EU maintain a mature relationship. In terms of the institutional framework, we have a huge number of dialogue mechanisms, starting from the Summit between the leaders of the two sides. Also, we have what we call the five high-level dialogue mechanisms on security and foreign policy, economic and trade, digital, climate change, and the people-to-people. Below that, at the working level, we have over 70 dialogue mechanisms. So all these dialogue mechanisms provide the institutional framework for the development of our relations.
In terms of political principles, I think that, for any bilateral relationship to develop and flourish, there have to be some guiding principles. We do need to have guiding principles in our relations. For instance, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and mutual respect for the core interest of each other. So these may constitute the legal and political framework for the bilateral relations. But as I said, I’m quite confident that this relationship has a bright future, and we have great hopes and expectations for our relationship with the EU.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you, Ambassador Fu. If I pick up one important term, multipolarity, which is being used by senior EU politicians like Josep Borrell or the European Commission President von der Leyen. My question to you is, does it matter that the EU leaders use the concept of multipolarity while the US, for instance, in its national security strategy from October 2022, used the international rule-based order as a conceptual framework and basically framed Russia and China as illiberal threats to that international rule-based order? What is that difference that you feel when you’re in Brussels?
Fu Cong: Actually, when I said that we have a lot of common grounds on international issues, multilateralism is definitely one of them. Both China and the EU advocate multilateralism, and we want to see a multi-polar world. We also believe that the current global governance could be improved for the benefit of the whole world. So these are the common themes that both China and the EU are advocating in the international arena.
When it comes to the US’s terminology, when they use rule-based international order, I think there needs to be some clarification on this. If they mean that the rules should be the international law and the UN Charter, there should be no problem because one of the most prominent features of Chinese foreign policy is respecting international law. If you look at international treaties, China actually acceded to more treaties than the United States, especially in my area, for instance. In the arms control area, China has acceded to more treaties than the United States and has never withdrawn from any international arms control treaty, unlike the United States. If they are talking about the UN Charter, we definitely have no problem with that. But we do have a problem when they talk about the rules that are concocted by a small group of countries, especially with the explicit purpose of excluding some countries, including China. So, of course, China is not in favor of that.
I also want to make another point. People have been saying that China is a revisionist state, and I will refute that because, as far as we see, we are the beneficiary of the existing international order. We are one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China is also one of the five recognized nuclear-weapon states. China has profited hugely from our accession to WTO. So why should China disrupt the existing international order? There is a lot of disinformation about the Chinese position on that. That is another point I want to make in connection with the question you asked.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you, Ambassador, for sharing the examples in your specific area of past experience on disarmament and international law. If you now switch to this topic, then I would like to quote, and maybe you are already referring to that, what (President) Ursula von der Leyen said at the end of March in her speech on the EU’s China policy. She said the “Chinese Communist Party’s clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its center.” You basically just refuted the term revisionism or revisionist because you think China is a beneficiary. Can you explain or comment on this specific sentence that (President) Ursula von der Leyen made in her China speech?
Fu Cong: Actually, I don’t think that is a correct characterization of the Chinese foreign policy. As I said, China has always stood by international law, especially the UN Charter. If we talk about the center of the international system, we have always said that the United Nations should be at the center of the international order and system. So China has never wanted to put China at the center of the international order. That is a total distortion of China’s foreign policy.
As a matter of fact, in this connection, I also want to mention the three great initiatives that China has put forward. One is the Global Development Initiative (GDI), another one is the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the latest one is the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). If you look at these three initiatives, for the GDI, it is very much in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations. When it comes to the GSI, if you read the document, it says upfront that we want to safeguard the UN Charter, and all the principles contained in the UN Charter need to be upheld. When it comes to the GCI, we talk about the interaction and mutual engagement among the civilizations in order to dispel intolerance, and so on and so forth. All these have one basic theme. That is to put the United Nations at the center of the international order. So I don’t think that anybody can accuse China of trying to put China at the center of any international order or anything like that.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you, Ambassador Fu. If you just go back and just stay on the point that you have been making on the GCI, the GDI and the GSI. Because you’re making the point and saying that it is actually within the UN order, and it’s strengthening the UN order. Can you maybe give some examples of why you think this is, or in which regard, it is trying to strengthen, deepen or improve the UN-centered system?
Fu Cong: I think that is quite clear. Let’s take the GDI for example. Our objective is to connect the Chinese assistance programs with the SDGs, which actually is a UN program, with the purpose of helping developing countries to eradicate poverty and to improve the infrastructure and the livelihood of the people. There are several objectives within the SDGs program. So China is fully aligned with that. The Chinese assistance program is actually in a very good position to connect with it. Actually, it is part of the global SDGs program. This is quite evident.
When it comes to security, if you look at the background paper that China has tabled, we talk about upholding all the international law, including the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries and non-interference in internal affairs, and also upholding the existing international treaty mechanism. We also talk about the fact that no country can obtain absolute security at the expense of other country’s security. All these principles are universally accepted principles of the whole world. All these are very much in line with the UN.
I want to draw your attention to the latest remark by the UN Secretary-General Guterres, criticizing the World Bank and IMF by saying that they should do more in providing assistance to developing countries. There was an example that during the pandemic, more loans were provided to the developed countries than to the developing countries. So these are the things that I think China would be happy to work with the international community to improve the international governance structure.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you. So this is a source that we can definitely look up. I think now we have discussed some of the conceptual discussions on multipolarity and systemic change. I would like to switch to something very tangible, although you were not there yet. Last year, the EU-China Summit was held virtually because of the pandemic context. It was actually described by the EU side as taking place between the deaf. This year, the expectation is to see an in-person meeting at some point in Beijing after the Council meeting. Could you give us a preview of this EU-China Summit?
Fu Cong: Let me first say that this Summit mechanism is an important mechanism between China and the EU. So far, we have held 23 Summits, and it was held annually. This is very important in the sense that the leaders can provide strategic guidance for the development of this very important bilateral relationship. Of course, when it comes to dialogue and consultation, sometimes we see eye to eye with each other, and on some other issues, we may not see eye to eye with each other. I think that is only natural. This is how we see the dialogue.
When it comes to this year’s Summit, we are working with our EU colleagues in preparing for the Summit. Just now, I mentioned those high-level dialogues. All these dialogues are meant to prepare for the Summit in the sense that we’ll try to see what we can achieve or what we call the deliverables for the Summit. The work is ongoing. We are going to see several senior officials from the EU visiting China, for instance, Mr. Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Mr. Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission. Executive Vice-President Mr. Timmermans is also visiting China very soon on climate change issues. The mechanisms and the dialogues are ongoing. We do hope that we can finalize the date for the Summit very soon and have the possibility to present to the world some of the concrete results that derive from this relationship.
Markus Herrmann: So we will be all watching. It’s gonna be time-framed in July, I presume. I would like to talk now a little bit about the triangle—the EU, the US, and China. The EU is striving for strategic autonomy but is still dependent on the US when it comes to security. But the EU and the US seem to get more aligned in their China policies. Just a couple of examples like the triptych—competitor, partner and rival, the concept of de-risking, the cooperation in the Trade Technology Council, and the G7 cooperation. How do you perceive the US as a factor in the EU-China relations?
Fu Cong: Let me first say that we support the strategic autonomy of the EU. I think China is the only big country that has come out in clear support of this strategy. We do hope that this strategy should not only remain in words, it should also remain in deeds. They need to be implemented and need to be reflected in the foreign policies of the EU countries.
With respect to the influence of the US, I do realize that the US is a major external influence on the Sino-European relationship. Let me put it this way, some of the European countries would not have taken the position or policies they have taken now vis-a-vis China had they not been influenced or, put it more bluntly, pressured by the United States, like in the case of Huawei and the semiconductors. Our view towards our relationship with the EU is that our relationship is not targeted at any third country. It should not be controlled by or subjugated to any third country. That is how we view this relationship. We have no quarrel with the EU if they want to develop relations with the United States. But we do want to flag the point that when they develop their relationship with the United States, it doesn’t have to be at the expense of China’s interest. That’s our basic position.
When it comes to de-risking, I have to acknowledge that it is better than decoupling. It’s good that the Western countries, the leaders in particular, realize that it is neither desirable nor feasible to decouple from China. So that’s why they have come up with a new catchword, which is de-risking. But we do not want to see de-risking becoming decoupling just in another name.
We do believe that we should not exaggerate the risks. Actually, in the case of China-EU relations, they always talk about the dependencies on China when they talk about de-risking strategy. But as a matter of fact, according to the EU’s own report, there is only a little over or even less than 1% of the total import from China that they can call a heavy dependence on China. So we need to put this whole issue in a proper perspective. We do not want to see this de-risking evolving into a decoupling policy just in a different name because we are quite concerned about some of the recent developments, especially the most recent one.
The most recent one is this new report by the EU Commission about Huawei and ZTE. This is actually a very unfortunate development. I have to say that it flies in the face of almost everything that the EU claims it stands for. For instance, the rule of law, open trade, free market, transparency, you name it. All these principles have been violated by the way that the EU Commission has handled its new report, which actually designated Huawei and ZTE as high-risk vendors without any legal basis or proper procedure. I will leave it at that, but I just want to say that we are watching the development very closely, and we don’t want to see the negative impact these things have on our relationship.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you, Ambassador Fu. I would like to come back to de-risking again. But maybe two more questions. As we speak on the political side, I’m getting several questions from online attendees, but it’s actually not the formal area of your responsibility. I’m getting questions about Germany and Germany’s upcoming China strategy because Premier Li Qiang is in Berlin today. Maybe I’ll still put the question, and you can see how you can, or you want to speak to it. How do you look at Germany’s development and the upcoming China strategy from an EU perspective that you are focused on?
Fu Cong: In terms of the terminology, they are more in line with the EU strategy on China. They also use what they call the triptych— partner, competitor, and systemic rival. That’s how they described its relationship (with China). The relationship between China and Germany is important, and we are glad that this relationship is developing despite the obstacles. Premier Li Qiang is now in Germany, and I’m sure this visit will give an additional boost to our relationship. I’m quite confident of that. I also want to emphasize that Germany is an important power within the EU and an influential power. I’m sure they will safeguard and maintain their own interest within the framework of the EU. That’s an area I mentioned in answering your first question. When it comes to the relationship between member states and the EU, there are areas where member states should stand their ground, and they should not allow policies, which have a direct impact on their foreign policy, national security, and fundamental economic interests, to be controlled or manipulated, if you like, by other institutions. Let me put it that way.
Markus Herrmann: You make strong points about the EU in connection with the Huawei equipment that you already referred to. You talked about the rule of law, open trade, and transparency. If I basically stay on this pessimistic dynamics of the relationship, there’s a rising voice in Europe that China should be viewed more as a systemic rival and economic competitor rather than just as a trade partner. When it comes to the future of EU-China relations, do we need something like a floor or a guardrail to keep us from veering into greater geopolitical confrontation or conflict? What would be the developments that would seriously worry you? Maybe you have already mentioned some of those that seriously worry you.
Fu Cong: Indeed, just now, you mentioned the triptych. For us, as I said, we do not see ourselves as a systemic rival of Europe. Definitely, we are partners. Competitor is OK because it is only natural when it comes to economics. A benign competition is important for the development of the economy. So we have no problem with that. But to call us a rival, it’s a bit far-fetched.
The sad thing is that it seems that some people are moving more and more in that direction. I don’t think it is in keeping with basic facts. Why should China and the EU become rivals? We are so far apart geographically, so there is no fundamental conflict of interest between us. Economically, we are actually complementary to each other. So we can compete, and we can cooperate, but there is no reason that we should become rivals. That’s how we see this relationship. One of the things that I’m quite concerned about here in Europe and in Brussels is that some politicians want to politicize this relationship and, especially, to put ideology above everything else. I don’t think that is fair and warranted. It is not in the interest of any side.
When it comes to whether this relationship should have a floor, indeed, we do believe that there is a need for some bottom lines, I would put it that way. For us, the Taiwan issue is the red line of the red lines. Recently, we have seen that a small number of politicians and bureaucrats within the EU institutions are trying to provoke China on the issue of Taiwan. I don’t think that is responsible. They have been saying that they want to keep the status quo. But, at the same time, they keep pushing the envelope and provoking China. That is not the way to maintain the status quo. That’s why I said that you need to be careful, and your irresponsible actions can only aggravate the tension. They are playing with fire. I’ve said this once, and I want to say this again. So they need to be careful. Frankly speaking, it is not in line with their proclaimed interest in keeping the status quo because they are themselves escalating the tension there.
There are other bottom lines. For instance, I mentioned previously that there is a need to respect the internal affairs of other countries. When China and Western countries started to develop relationship several decades ago, no country expect to change the social system of the other since day one. If that was a given when the bilateral relationship started, we don’t see why they want to see us as a rival. We do not want to change the social system of Europe or European countries. We respect the free choice of the people. So they should do the same. As President Xi said yesterday to US Secretary of State Blinken that we should respect each other, that includes respect for the social system of each other. If you talk about the floor, these are the floors.
There are other things that are important for the healthy development of relations. For instance, the respect for international law and, when it comes to trade, the respect for the rules of WTO. These will provide a basis for the development of relations. If we can keep these bottom lines, the relationship will not veer too much off the road.
Markus Herrmann: Thanks a lot. So you have been already listing multiple concerns as I ask you what worries you. If I can pull up one point that you made, just to pull it up again, you said that one of the dynamics that concerns you or worries you is the politicization by European politicians and you said it’s driven by ideology. We talked earlier about systemic change, and now you made an example of the social system. Can you characterize what this ideology is that you think on the European side is, in your perspective, creating all these concerns?
Fu Cong: If you analyze the situation objectively, when we talk about mutual interest, it is so evident that it is good that the two sides should develop a robust economic relationship. That is the call of the business community on both sides. Since I arrived, I have been reaching out to many people. I have talked to many business leaders here in Brussels, and they are very concerned about the political atmosphere that is prevalent today. They all express the desire to develop relations with China to increase investment.
This is only common sense, and China is such a huge market. How can Europe develop economically without profiting from the Chinese market? I think this is only common sense. But if you look at the policies, the remarks of some of the politicians, and some of the regulations and legislations that are being considered, you would understand that there are people who do not want to see the development of this sound economic relationship. They always talk about China being a systemic rival and a communist party (ruling state), and so on and so forth. That’s why they put ideological consideration above everything else. That actually harms the relationship, to the detriment of their own interest.
When it comes to political issues, as I said, China shares many things (with Europe). There are so many things that China can work together (with Europe). But if you keep harming China’s interests and challenging China’s social system and political system, how can you expect China to cooperate with you, if your ultimate purpose is to challenge China’s political system. As a diplomat, I see this as common sense. But unfortunately, some people here refuse to recognize this out of ideological considerations.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you for all the explanations. My suggestion is that we have about ten minutes left. I’m also looking at some questions that I’m receiving. My suggestion would be that I’ll raise another three questions and two closing questions. So we have five questions for 10 minutes. If that’s broadly fine, we can try. Maybe the first one that I would like to raise is going back to de-risking. We both know, maybe we all know, the EU is publishing its economic security strategy today, maybe later today or very soon. Does China feel concerned about this strategy? Does it matter that China’s policy since April 2020 through the Central Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs itself puts emphasis on supply and industrial chain stability and security ?How do you comment on this point?
Fu Cong: Firstly, we understand the desire of EU and European countries for a resilient supply chain and industrial capability. Secondly, when it comes to economic security, as I said, we should not overblow this concept, and we should put it into a proper perspective. It should not be exaggerated to the extent that it becomes an obstacle to free and open trade. The third point I want to make is that we should not conflate economic security with national security. Because, as I understand the constitution of the EU, national security resides within the exclusive privilege of member states. For the EU to talk about national security, I don’t think that is even appropriate. So economic security should not be conflated with national security.
But unfortunately, as I mentioned previously, we do have a foretaste of what economic security might entail by the example of Huawei. A few days before the adoption or the announcement of this economic security doctrine, they put forward this report on Huawei and ZTE in the name of national security and de-risking. I always say that we have been asking the EU to clarify what they mean by de-risking. If this is what they mean by de-risking, I think that is really very concerning. It is not appropriate because this was basically driving the Chinese companies out of the European market. It’s not going to go down well with China, the Chinese companies, and the rest of the world. Because now, the credibility of the EU policies and the predictability of the EU as a single market is also on the line. That’s why I said this issue actually flew in the face of everything that the EU claimed it stands for.
You also asked about China’s policy. Indeed, we talk about what we call dual circulation, but I want to draw your attention to what President Xi said recently. He said the reason why we emphasized the building of our own capability was not to close our doors. We are doing this because somebody wants to cut China off the global supply chain. I think that everybody knows what the US is doing concerning semiconductors. What do we expect China to do? If they cut China out of the supply chain, China, of course, will have to rely on itself to develop its own capabilities. But at the same time, what President Xi went on to say was very important. He said that we would not close our doors, and our doors would remain open to all those who actually want to trade with us and work with us.
I want to take Huawei as an example again. In the case of Huawei, Huawei is excluded from all the 5G core networks in Europe. But in the case of the European IT companies Erickson and Nokia, there is no such exclusion. So that shows that while China emphasizes the importance of building up its own self-resilience, we do not take the same measures that the EU is exhorting its member states to take, that is to drive Chinese companies out of the European market. China is not doing that. In the case of the IT industry, it is not doing this. That is a Chinese policy in the face of what the US and some of the European countries have been doing to companies like Huawei and ZTE.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you, Ambassador Fu. Maybe the last very brief content question I would like to go to the closing part. We’ve discussed broadly EU-China relations, and we know that the Council meetings are coming up by the end of the month. We know the formal policies encapsulated in the strategic Outlook 2019. Maybe just to help summarize for the audience, do you think some of the policies will change in the coming weeks?
Fu Cong: You mean the EU policy towards China? That’s for the member states to decide. We are following this with interest. The Sino-EU relations have been developing since the end of last year. There is very good momentum. So many European leaders have visited China, starting from Chancellor Scholz in November last year, and then President Michel, President Macron, President von der Leyen, Prime Minister of Spain, and some other national leaders. On the Chinese side, we also have had several high-level delegations to the EU. Of course, the highest one so far is Premier Li Qiang’ visit to Germany and France. This actually is building up momentum for this relationship. I’m quite confident that all these will provide more impetus to make our relationship more robust.
I mentioned that since I came here, I’ve been reaching out to the people. I do feel that there is such a wealth of goodwill towards China and the strong desire to develop relations in all fields with China. So I’m very confident about the prospect and the future of this relationship. At the same time, we do realize that there are some challenges. There are noises from a small number of politicians for whatever reason. Some may even be personal. They are trying their best to hinder this relationship, but I’m sure common sense and common interests will prevail at the end of the day.
So this is how I see this relationship. I do hope, once again, that when it comes to foreign policy, member states need to stand their ground. They are the ones to say where the national interest lies. They are the ones to say where their national security lies. They should not be left to some bureaucrats who do not have any direct interest in this. So this is how we see this relationship. This is how we hope that the EU can stand on the side of common sense and common interests so that our relationship can prosper.
Markus Herrmann: You’ve been very clear, Ambassador Fu. Let me change with the final more personal question. What do you like or what have you liked most about Europe and about being posted in Europe and your job here?
Fu Cong: I like Europe. In my diplomatic career, all my postings have been in Europe. I am a great admirer of the European culture and civilization. I like to study European history. I think that it’s very important, especially for a diplomat, to study history. I’m a strong believer in this famous quotation that those who do not remember or learn from history are condemned to repeat it.
We are now at a very crucial stage and a critical juncture in Europe and in the world. There are many historical lessons that we need to learn. That’s also one of the reasons I like Belgium because there are so many historical sites in Belgium. So I’ve been using the weekends to visit all the small cities and towns. The cities and towns may not be big, but they are full of history. I’ve been visiting all these, and I like Belgium very much.
As far as my work is concerned, I want to, first and foremost, be a good listener because I want to listen to the views and concerns of the other side so as to understand what their concerns are. Secondly, I want to be a good speaker. As a Chinese diplomat and Ambassador, of course, I need to speak for China. I’m glad that so far, I’ve been having a good audience and good hearing from all walks of life.
Thirdly, I think that it is also important that I want to be a good deal maker. We both have our own interests to safeguard, and we also have our own concerns. So it is important that we listen to each other and we speak about our concerns and interests. But in the end, we need to make things done. That is most important. So I also want to be a good deal-maker between the two sides as an Ambassador. It’s a cliche to say that I want to be a bridge. But actually, that is how I see myself. There are things that can be done despite our differences, which sometimes even appear to be irreconcilable. But so long as we continue the dialogue, I’m sure there will be ways that we can find to resolve our differences. That is what I firmly believe. That is what I see my job is here in Brussels.
Markus Herrmann: Thank you very much, Ambassador Fu, for creating this very compelling and probably universal formula for diplomacy. You said listener, speaker, and deal-maker. Secondly, you reminded us of the importance of history, in particular, in Europe. Thirdly, I would like to just thank you for taking the time in your busy day-to-day work to spend here in the discussion and for basically responding to all these different questions. Thank you very much for joining this webinar discussion.
Fu Cong: Thank you.